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Atlantic Legal History
Ernest Clarke and "The Course Of Law Cannot Be
Jim Phillips* Stopped": The Aftermath Of The
Cumberland Rebellion in The Civil
Courts Of Nova Scotia
This article examines a series of cases launched in the Nova Scotia courts
following the Cumberland Rebellion of 1776. In these cases loyalists sued former
rebels, including those granted amnesty by the authorities, for losses sustained
during the rebellion. The article traces the history of the cases and places them
in the context of post-rebellion government policy. It argues that such proceed-
ings were without precedent and effectively took the place of official schemes of
expropriation of rebel land and compensation to loyalists. It also suggests that the
use of civil courts in this way prolonged and exacerbated the social and political
tensions in a county badly split in its reactions to the American Revolution. Finally,
it links this litigation, and particularly some questionable decisions by judges of
the Supreme Court, to criticisms of the administration of justice in late eighteenth-
century Nova Scotia.
Dans cet article, les auteurs examinent une serie de causes intentees en
Nouvelle-Ecosse suite a la Rebellion de 1776, au cours desquelles les loyalistes
poursuiverentd'anciens rebelles, incluant ceux a quil'amnistie fut accordees, pour
les pertes subies lors de la revolte. Les auteurs situent ces litiges dans le contexte
de la politique gouvernementale de I'apr~s-Rebellion. Ils avancent I'idee que ces
litiges etaient sans precedents et ont effectivement remplac6 des pratiques
officielles d'expropriation des terres appartenantaux rebelles et de compensation
aux loyalistes. Ce recours aux tribunaux civils a maintenu et exacerb6 les
tensions sociales et politiques dans un comt6 deji divise dans ses reactions
envers la R6volution am6ricaine. Finalement, ces litiges sont utilis6es afin
d'examiner le bien-fonde des critiques 6 I'endroit de I'administration de la justice
vers la fin du 18e si&cle en Nouvelle-Ecosse.
* Ernest Clarke is an independent historian whose book The Siege of Fort Cumberland 1776:
An Episode in the American Revolution has recently been published by McGill-Queen's
University Press. Jim Phillips is Associate Professor, Faculty of Law and Centre of Criminol-
ogy, University of Toronto. We thank Philip Girard, Archibald Kaiser, and the anonymous
reviewer for the Journal for their comments on an earlier verison. Support for the research was
provided by the Wright Foundation for Legal Research, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.
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Introduction
I. John Eagleson and Christopher Harper Go To Law, 1778-1780
II. Executing the Judgments and Retaliatory Patriot Litigation,
1779-1780
III. "Reduced to Wretched Indigence": Law, Politics and Power in
Cumberland, 1780-1785




In November 1776 a small band of pro-American residents of Cumberland
County, Nova Scotia, led by Colonel Jonathan Eddy, opted decisively for
the American side in the struggle with the British crown by laying siege
to Fort Cumberland. Some 200 men, most of them Cumberland residents
who had moved from New England a decade or so previously, were able
to bottle up the garrison for a month or so. During the same period they
took over effective control of local government. In doing so they
displaced, and in some cases plundered and abused, the other significant
immigrant fraction in the county, Yorkshire-born settlers who all took the
loyalist side. The hope that this action would bring Nova Scotia onto the
continental side was soon dashed, however, when a relief force arrived
and together with the garrison easily dispersed the besiegers. Eddy's
force broke and ran. A few were captured, and some 60 or so made it to
the safety of New England, while most took advantage of an immediate
amnesty offer from Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Goreham, commander at
Fort Cumberland, that promised his intercession for official pardons for
those who laid down their arms. The county was quickly brought back
under official British rule, although tensions remained high and only the
presence of the military prevented a recurrence of rebellion.1
1. For the Cumberland rebellion see E. A. Clarke, The Siege of Fort Cumberland 1776: An
Episode in the American Revolution (Montreal and Kingston: McGill Queen's University
Press, 1995).
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Official policy in the wake of the Cumberland rebellion proved
remarkably lenient. Goreham's amnesty was honoured, and only a
handful of men, captured before it was offered or who tried but failed to
escape, were held and threatened with treason proceedings. Of these only
two were tried and convicted of high treason, and they avoided the
gallows by escaping from their prison cells.2
The fact that the armed rebellion was easily dealt with, and that the
heavy hand of the law of treason was little in evidence, does not mean that
the consequences of rebellion were short-lived, nor does it mean that
retribution against the perpetrators was negligible. In fact, to concentrate
only on the official use of the treason laws would be to miss a crucial
aspect of the rebellion. The events of 1776 also precipitated a series of
suits in the civil courts which began in 1778 and lasted for at least 30
years. A study of this civil litigation provides an opportunity to consider
a theme largely untouched in the Canadian historical literature-the
extent to which intra-community conflict can be played out in the civil
courts. Political, economic and religious fora are the traditional ones
discussed by historians when they examine such struggles. While
Cumberland county saw community conflict aplenty in such areas, before
and after 1776, that conflict also infused the legal system. Indeed, we
would argue that the availability of that system for rebellion-related
litigation was a principal contributor to the longevity of tensions in the
Cumberland community.
I. John Eagleson and Christopher Harper Go To Law, 1778-1780
While few of Cumberland' s loyalists had a good 1776, the Reverend John
Eagleson, representative in Cumberland Township of the Society for the
Propagation of the Gospel, had a particularly bad one. In November of
that year not only were his house and lands seized for patriot use, and his
goods expropriated and used or sold for the same cause, but he also found
himself taken prisoner and conveyed to New England. There he was
forced to reside until the early summer of 1778, when he was released.3
2. For the treason trials and related events see E. A. Clarke & J. Phillips, "Rebellion and
Repression in Nova Scotia in the Era of the American Revolution" in J.B. Wright & F.M.
Greenwood, eds., Canadian State Trials Volume One: Law, Politics and Security Measures,
1608-1837 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press and Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal
History, 1996).
3. For this see E.A. Clarke, "Cumberland Planters and the Aftermath of the Attack on Fort
Cumberland" in M. Conrad, ed., They Planted Well: New England Planters in Maritime
Canada (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press 1988) at 53-54. For Eagleson generally see E.A.
Clarke, J. Phillips, & S. Waddams, "The Trials and Trial of John Eagleson" (unpublished ms.,
1995) and G. Tratt, "John Eagleson" Dictionary of Canadian Biography (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press 1966-), vol. 4 at 258-259.
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He seems to have been the only Cumberland loyalist thus treated, and the
cause may well have been his success in an earlier court case, decided in
1773, in which the local New England Planters Congregationalist church
had lost its glebe lands to the Church of England presided over locally by
Eagleson.4 Whatever the reason for this forced exile, Eagleson was a very
bitter man on his return. His resentment only increased when he was
confronted by the fact that his house had been destroyed by the patriots.
5
He had indeed "sustained heavy losses by the rebels," and tried without
success to obtain some official compensation.6 He concluded that it was
"a duty I owed myself to Endeavour to Recover, if possible, some part of
my Property," and as a result filed a suit in the Halifax Supreme Court
against seven patriots for damages totalling £70O.'
Eagleson's action was probably started in mid-1778, although no
formal proceedings were held until the court sat in Michaelmas Term
(October-November) of that year.8 His counsel was George Thompson,
probably a loyalist refugee from the rebellious colonies and thus sympa-
thetic to the cause of his clients.9 Eagleson's pleadings complained that
4. For a detailed account of this see E.A. Clarke, "The Cumberland Glebe Dispute and the
Background to the American Revolution in Nova Scotia, 1771-1774" (1993)42 U.N.B.L.J. 95.
5. Letter of 4 July 1778, in Journals of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel
[hereinafter SPG Journals], Nova Scotia Archives and Records Management [formerly Public
Archives of Nova Scotia and hereafter NSARM], Manuscript Group [hereinafter MG] 17,
vol. 21, 330.
6. Eagleson to Chipman, 8 April 1788, Chipman Papers, New Brunswick Museum, [herein-
after Chipman Papers] F 1, Packet 6, No. 34, and Letter of 30 July 1779 in SPG Journals,
MG 17, vol. 21, 670.
7. Eagleson v. Oulton et al., NSARM, Supreme Court Records, Record Group 39, Halifax
County [hereinafter RG 39], Series J, [Proceedings], vol. 3, 179; vol. 6, 83; vol. 98, 419, and
Series C [Case Files], vol. 20. All details of the suit are from the case file unless otherwise
specified. The action was tried in Halifax County because circuits to Cumberland County had
been suspended in 1776 and were not renewed until 1782: see NSARM, Council Minutes
[hereinafter Minutes], 30 April 1776, RG 1, vol. 189, and Bulkeley to Tonge, 23 Aug 1782,
RG 1, vol. 136, 304. One factor in Eagleson's decision to use the civil courts in this way may
have been the success of the crown in suing some patriot absconders for small debts (£6 and
£8) in the previous year: see R. v. Elijah Ayer Jr. and William Eddy and R. v. Elijah Ayer Sr.
and William Maxwell, RG 39, Series J, vol. 6, 40-41.
8. See Eagleson's later comment that "as soon as I returned home, I consulted counsel and
entered my suit in the Supreme Court at Halifax." Eagleson to Chipman, 8 April 1788, Chipman
Papers, F 1, Packet 6, No. 34. The defendants were first summoned to appear on 29 July 1778:
see RG 39, Series J, vol. 98, 419.
9. Very little is known about Thompson, not even his date of admission to practise at the bar.
However the Supreme Court proceedings books show that he first practised in Halifax from
1778, which was presumably around the time that he arrived there: see RG 39, Series J, vols.
I and 3-8. He died in 1783: A.E. Marble, Deaths, Burials and Probate of Nova Scotians, 1749-
1799 (2 vols., Halifax: Privately Published, 1990), vol. 2 at 108.
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in November 1776 the defendants had broken into his house, and
damaged it and stolen food, furniture, farm implements, household
goods, livestock, timber, clothing, books and miscellaneous other goods.
The pleadings also complained of his confinement and transportation to
"his majesty's rebellious colonies," where he "was imprisoned, insulted,
maltreated and abused," and was "put to great expense to support and
maintain himself and to secure and effect his liberation and escape."
Of the seven defendants selected by Eagleson, three-William Howe,
Ebenezer Gardner, and John MacGowan-were among those who had
decamped to New England following the lifting of the siege of Fort
Cumberland. Howe was oneof the most notorious rebels, one of only five
men considered sufficiently beyond the pale to have been excluded by
Goreham from his amnesty offer. He, as well as Gardner and MacGowan,
was the subject of an outstanding treason indictment. The other four-
Charles Oulton, Jesse Bent, John Fillmore and Robert MacGowan-had
all also taken part on the patriot side but were still in Nova Scotia in 1778.
Bent likely took immediate advantage of the amnesty, but Oulton,
Fillmore and MacGowan did not and all spent time in Halifax jail in the
early months of 1777. Fillmore obtained his release when he took the
oaths of allegiance in April 1777 and MacGowan likely followed suit.
Oulton, Fillmore's brother-in-law, escaped with the two men convicted
of treason, was retaken, and was actually out on bail in 1778 with an
indictment for treason still outstanding against him.'"
Eagleson must have selected these defendants for two reasons. First,
they were, as he put it, "most forward & Active in the Insurrection and the
plundering of my House and Property." That is, it was not enough to show
that he had suffered damage, he had also to show that the defendants were
responsible. Second, and equally importantly, Eagleson needed to sue
men with property, to be in a position if he won to "Recover ... some part
of my Property out of the Estates of the Absconding Rebels."'1I
The defendants engaged Daniel Wood Sr. to argue their case, the most
senior member of the local bar and probably its most experienced and
accomplished litigator; he was also, probably not coincidentally, the man
chosen the year before by Parker Clarke to defend him on a charge of high
treason arising out of the rebellion. 2 In October 1778 a default judgment
10. Clarke & Phillips, supra note 2 at 180-184 and 189-190.
11. Letter of 30 July 1779, SPG Journals, MG 17, vol. 21, 670.
12. Wood was one of perhaps two lawyers who came with the first settlers to Halifax in 1749,
and he was sworn in as attorney of the General Court in August 1750. In addition to his
extensive court practice he acted as Clerk of the Peace for Halifax County for many years: see
E.C. Wright, Planters and Pioneers, 2nd ed. (Wolfville, N.S.: Lancelot Press, 1982) at 293;
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was entered against the three absconders, while the case against the other
defendants was adjourned. A further adjournment was granted in January
1779, and although witnesses were summoned to attend a trial in April,'
3
there is no record of it having ever taken place. What did occur in April
1779, however, was an assessment of Eagleson's damages and in the
summer of 1779 he received a formal judgment in his favour for £700
damages and £22 costs against the three absconders, a sum that was
rumoured locally to have been well in excess of what he had actually
lost.'4 It was presumably his success in obtaining these judgments that
caused Eagleson not to pursue the case against the other defendants, or
another suit he had begun in the summer of 1778, against patriots Mark
Patton Sr. and Mark Patton Jr., for £300 in damages. 5
In the other major suit, launched in 1779, Christopher Harper, a
prominent Cumberland loyalist and justice of the peace (J.P.), also
engaged Thompson's services, to sue a total of nine patriots. 6 Like
Eagleson he selected men prominent in the rebellion, and also like
Eagleson he chose both absconders and those who had stayed and
officially rehabilitated themselves after the lifting of the siege. The
former group comprised three men: Parker Clarke, resident of Fort
Lawrence, farmer, doctor, a leading patriot, and one of the two men
convicted of high treason in April 1777; and Simeon Chester and Elijah
Ayer Sr., both members of Cumberland's ruling "committee of safety" in
1776, who were among the group of Cumberland patriots who made good
their escape in December 1776 and who thus had treason indictments
waiting for them if they returned. The latter group comprised Samuel
Smith, William Jones, Mark Patton Sr., David Forrest, John Simpson, and
William Lawrence. Simpson had been in Halifax jail in April 1777 under
J.B. Cahill, "The Origin and Evolution of the Attorney and Solicitor in the Legal Profession
of Nova Scotia" (1991) 14 Dal. L. J. 273 at 279; RG 39, Series J, vols. I - 11, passim; Petition
of Daniel Wood Sr. to Assembly, 12 March 1789, RG 5, Series A, vol. 2, No 143. For Wood's
defence of Clarke see Clarke & Phillips, supra note 2 at 183.
13. Witnesses were called for 26 April. They were principally Cumberland loyalists:
Christopher Harper, William Duncan, Richard Fritton, William Milligan, Joseph Cousins, and
Thomas Robinson.
14. Order of 3 August 1779, RG 39, Series J, vol. 6,83. Some II years later Anglican Bishop
Charles Inglis noted that in a conversation with an Annapolis lawyer "many particulars were
... mentioned of his [Eagleson] recovering damages from disaffected persons for his losses in
the Rebellion at the expense of truth." Journal of Charles Inglis, 16 June 1790, MG 1, vol. 480.
15. Eagleson v. Patton and Patton (1778), RG 39, Series J, vol. 3, 181, and vol. 98, 422.
Information on this case is very scanty; all we know is that the summons was issued to the
Pattons on 28 August 1778 but was not returned into court, perhaps because they could not be
found. However, Mark Patton Sr. was available a little later to be sued by Harper; see infra
note 16.
16. This case can be followed in RG 39, Series J, vol. 6, 126-127; vol. 99, p. 9, and in Series
C, vol. 22. The following account is taken from the case file unless otherwise stated.
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indictment for treason, but most of the others had likely taken the oaths
immediately after the siege. 7 The fact that Harper's suit was launched in
April 1779 suggests that Eagleson's success may have served as some-
thing of an inspiration to him.
Harper sued all nine defendants on two grounds. One writ was issued
for "trover and conversion."' 8 It complained that in November 1776 a
large variety of Harper's goods-livestock, stored grain, farm imple-
ments, and household furniture and articles-had ended up in the posses-
sion of the defendants, who had "converted the said goods and chattels to
their own.., use." Harper claimed that the goods converted were worth
£1,366 and requested damages of £1,500. A second writ was issued in
"trespass vi et armis," and accused the defendants of having been
responsible for pillaging Harper's farm on 6 November, 1776, the day
that an open armed rebellion began, and on "divers other days and times
between that day and the first day of December."' 9 The writ complained
that they had broken into his house, frightened and driven away his
family, pillaged his goods, torn down buildings and taken away building
materials, and burned some of the structures. On this writ he sued for a
total of £2,000. As with Eagleson, there is evidence that Harper's
demands were excessive.
20
All the defendants-those still in thejurisdiction and the absconders-
denied the allegations through their counsel, Gerald Fitzgerald.2' Delays
again ensued, with the result that the trial did not take place until July
17. See Clarke & Phillips, supra note 2 at 181-182 and 189-190.
18. The action in trover was used in any circumstances in which the defendant came into
possession of personal property belonging to the plaintiff; nothing turned on how it got there,
indeed the fiction in trover was that the property had been "found" by the defendant-all the
plaintiff had to prove was the "conversion," the use by the defendant of the property for him
or her self. See J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 3rd ed. (London:
Butterworths, 1990) at 449-451, and J.B. Ames, "History of Trover" (1897) 11 Harv. L. R. 277.
19. "Vi et armis" translates literally as "with force and arms." This was a form of action used
when an interference to person or property was perpetrated "against the peace," with violence.
It was used in all trespass actions before the late seventeenth century, even when this was
merely a fiction and the action was really in negligence of some kind. See Baker, ibid. at
71-75 and 464-467.
20. "[I]t was well known that the Account exhibited by... Harper of his Losses was false and
fraudulent." Answer of John Bent, in NSARM, Chancery Court Records, RG 36, Series A,
No. 82.
21. Default judgment forms in the case file suggest that Thompson attempted to obtain
judgment against the absconders in January 1780, but he must have been unsuccessful.
Fitzgerald may, like Thompson, have been a loyalist refugee, for he was called to the Nova
Scotia bar in October 1778. He was an active litigator in 1779-1780 and again in 1784-1786.
He died in 1788: RG 39, Series M, vol. 24A; RG 39, Series J, vols. 5-8; Nova Scotia Gazette,
2 Dec. 1788.
"The Course Of Law Cannot Be Stopped'
1780. By that time Simpson's name had disappeared from the list of
defendants, although the records contain no clue as to why. On July 25,
1780 six of the defendants-Clarke, Smith, Ayer, Jones, Chester and
Lawrence-were found liable in both trover and trespass, with no
liability attaching to Patton or Forrest. Damages were set at £585 for both
the trover and trespass suits, plus costs of £42 16s for the former and £36
5s for the latter, for a total of almost £1,250.
Thus while the Cumberland loyalists did not have the satisfaction of
seeing large numbers of their political enemies convicted of treason in the
criminal courts, two leading members of that loyalist community won
substantial victories over those enemies in the civil courts. Yet we cannot
see these as simply "ordinary" civil proceedings. While the suits would
have been unexceptionable responses to the actions of the defendants
outside the context of a rebellion, given that context they were somewhat
unusual. Two particular features of them should be noted. In the first
place the men who had either been convicted of treason (Clarke) or
indicted but never tried because they had escaped (Ayres, Chester,
Gardner, Howe, and MacGowan) were all liable to see their property
forfeited to the crown, either as a result of conviction or as a consequence
of outlawry.22 Yet large-scale confiscations do not appear to have taken
place; instead unofficial actors were able to achieve the same thing. This
represented a departure from prior British practices; substantial confisca-
tions of property followed the English Civil War, the Cromwellian
conquest of Ireland, and the Jacobite rebellions.23
Secondly, in the case of those who had repented of their part in the
rebellion and obtained an amnesty, the amnesty was substantially deval-
ued through the exaction of private retribution in the civil courts. The
effective contradiction here was not lost on the defendants, who at some
point, probably in early 1779, tried to head off the litigation by invoking
the amnesty. They were even able to persuade Goreham to intercede on
22. We have discussed elsewhere the fact that outlawry proceedings against Cumberland
absconders were started but not taken very far, probably as a result of British policy: see Clarke
& Phillips, supra note 2 at 192-195.
23. See D. Pennington, "The War and the People" in J. Morrill, ed., Reactions to the English
Civil War 1642-1649 (London: MacMillan, 1982); D. Underdown, Somerset in the Civil War
and Interregnum (Newton Abbott: David & Charles, 1973) at 160-161; A. Fraser, Cromwell:
Our Chief of Men (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973) at 497; L. Gooch, The Desperate
Faction: The Jacobites of North-East England 1688-1745 (Hull: University of Hull Press,
1995) at 98.
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their behalf with the Halifax authorities.24 This intervention produced
little more than another lawsuit,25 however, for the Halifax authorities
rejected Goreham's argument unequivocally: "The petitioners may be
entitled by your declaration and by several proclamations to their Liberty
and the repossession of their property and to pardon for offences they
committed against the Crown," he was told, but not to "an exemption for
the injuries they may have done to private people." For the Governor to
intervene would be to exercise "an authority arbitrary and illegal" for "the
course of Law cannot be stopped and the injured have a right to seek
remedy.
2 6
This refusal to intervene is instructive. In part it may have derived from
the stated motive, an unwillingness to interfere with the civil courts.
While contemporary legal literature provides no insights into whether a
government could, or should, have intervened," there was a precedent
for doing so in the indemnity measures of the Commonwealth.28 More-
over, the Supreme Court clearly had the power to prevent the cases going
forward, just as they later stayed all executions based on the litigation. 9
Thus this explanation likely conceals a clear policy choice. Decisions to
prosecute or not to prosecute for treason and other lesser offences, and
whether to confiscate the property of rebels, were matters of government
24. According to Eagleson this intervention occurred "shortly after I had entered my suit,"
and he found it scandalous that Goreham had dared to support the defendants, to "in a dark and
Underhand manner ... Use all his Influence & Interest... to have my suit laid aside." Letter
of 30 July 1779, in SPG Journals, MG 17, vol. 21, 670 and 671.
25. In June 1779 Goreham sued Eagleson for "scandal and defamation," asking for £5,000
in damages. The case does not seem to have proceeded past the initial filing stage: Goreham
v. Eagleson, RG 39, Series J, vol. 99, 10, and Series C, vol. 20. Doubtless this resulted from
Eagleson's complaining about Goreham's intervention, and perhaps particularly from sugges-
tions by the irascible Eagleson that Goreham's loyalty was questionable. In the same letter
home in which he recounted the argument over the terms of the amnesty Eagleson stated that
he "must observe" that Goreham was "born & Educated in New England," and he perhaps was
less oblique in making statements locally. Letter of 30 July 1779, in SPG Journals, MG 17,
vol. 21, 671 (emphasis in original).
26. Bulkeley to Goreham, 8 June 1779, RG 1, vol. 136, 272-273. The court records indicate
that the summonses were served in mid-May 1779 on those still in the colony, and while there
is no record of letters to Halifax, the timing of the government's response suggests that the
defendants immediately responded by invoking the amnesty.
27. Neither Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England (4 vols.,
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765-1769), nor any of the other contemporary works we consulted,
had anything to say on this question, suggesting that it had not seriously been raised.
28. Both parliamentary and royalist forces were prevented from taking actions at common
law. See J.S. Morrill, The Revolt in the Provinces: Conservatives and Radicals in the English
Civil War 1630-1650 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1976) at 76.
29. Infra, text accompanying note 81.
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policy, not issues that would normally be left to a "course of Law." It was
perfectly plausible for the former patriots to paint the litigation by
loyalists as an attempt to subvert the general amnesty policy, and thus for
the authorities to have justified an intervention. There is a fine line
between "offences against the crown" and "injuries done to private
people," a line so fine that it often becomes invisible. Presumably the
authorities would not have countenanced criminal prosecutions or dam-
age suits based on the wounding of men who had fought on the loyalist
side. It could equally well be argued that amnesty for acts of rebellion
should have included amnesty for property destruction or damage caused
in the course of rebellion. Instead, by not stopping these private suits,
government was effectively permitting loyalist claims to be charged
directly to individual rebels-indeed in some cases to those rebels who
had returned to their allegiance.
Thus one must conclude that the government approved of the activities
of Eagleson and Harper, and perhaps even saw it as an opportunity to
"punish" a rebel community which had, for a variety of reasons, largely
escaped without penalty. Certainly Chief Justice Bryan Finucane, who
presided in both cases, appears to have shown much sympathy for the
plaintiffs.3 ° The civil litigation also compensated loyalists, and without
cost to government. If it was considered necessary to reimburse those
who had lost property during the rebellion, some form of official
compensation scheme could have been arranged, similar to those that had
been used in the past,3' or those that would be used in the future-for
example, the Loyalist Claims Commission put into place after 1783 or the
rebellion losses legislation in the Canadas in the 1840s.32 This was not
done, and indeed the whole imbroglio might have struck some Halifax
officials as a very welcome development, for it allowed loyalists to be
compensated, government to pursue the official policy of leniency, and
some "punishment" to be meted out to rebels.
II. Executing the Judgments and Retaliatory Patriot Litigation,
1779-1780
The loyalists may have won in court, but that was by no means the end of
the matter. Judgments needed to be executed, and both Eagleson and
Harper wished to take the lands of the defendants to satisfy their claims.
30. Eagleson attributed his success "in great measure" to the "Abilities and knowledge" of
Finucane: Letter of Eagleson, 30 July 1779, in SPG Journals, MG 17, vol. 21, 671.
31. See Underdown, supra note 23 at 161, for compensation given to the town of Taunton and
certain individuals.
32. See the discussion of the Loyalist Claims Commission, infra note 88.
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In England this was impossible, for at common law land could not
normally be seized in execution for a money judgment, although the
income from land could be taken.33 However by both an imperial statute
which made land in the colonies available for seizure, and local law, this
could be done in Nova Scotia.34 This did not mean that the land could
simply be seized, for there was a complicated procedure to try to ensure
that the acquisition of a debtor's title by a creditor was a last resort. First,
real property could only be taken if the debtor had insufficient personal
property to cover the debt. Second, if land was to be attached, the provost
marshall (the local equivalent of the English sheriff), was required to have
the lands appraised, both as to their value and as to the rents they yielded,
by three "discreet indifferent men," one chosen by the debtor, one by the
creditor, and one by himself. If the appraisers believed that the rents of the
land over two years would be enough to cover the debt (including costs
and interest), then execution would be levied on the rents only. Third,
only if the rents by themselves were not, in the opinion of a majority of
the appraisers, considered sufficient to pay the debt could the land itself
be seized-part of the land if it could be partitioned, all of it if not.3 In
this instance the provost marshall was to deliver title to the creditor.36
Fourth, such delivery of title was subject to an "equity of redemption," a
right in the debtor to pay the debt in full within two years and take back
the title.33 Finally, it should be noted that local law distinguished between
situations where the land was appraised as being worth more than the
value of the debt, and those where it was not. In the former case, once the
two years had passed, the land had to be sold by public auction conducted
by the provost marshall and accounts adjusted accordingly.3" By impli-
33. Baker, supra note 18 at 78.
34. The English statute is at 5 Geo II, c. 7 (1732). The Nova Scotia legislation, passed by the
colony's first assembly, is An Act for Making Lands and Tenements Liable to the Payment of
Debts, Statutes of Nova Scotia [hereafter S.N.S.] 1758, c. 15. This statute was amended later,
and relevant amendments are discussed below.
35. A later amending statute stipulated five appraisers to be appointed if only part of the land
was to be taken, and required that they take steps to prevent the retained lands being rendered
relatively worthless: An Act to further explain and amend... An Act for Making Lands and
Tenements Liable to the Payment of Debts, S.N.S. 1773, c. 4, s. 2.
36. Title could also be taken after two years if the appraisers' opinion that rents would suffice
turned out to be incorrect.
37. The 1773 amending Act contained another provision which could have turned out to be
very relevant to persons concerned in these cases. It stated that "femes covert, persons non
compos mentis, imprisoned, or in captivity, minors, or persons out of the Province" had six
years after the end of their legal disability in which to sue for recovery of the equity of
redemption: An Act to further amend and explain. . . ,S.N.S. 1773, c. 4, s. 3.
38. See An Act to further explain and amend.... S.N.S. 1773, c. 4, s. 1, which elaborated on
the notice required for such sale.
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cation, land appraised as worth less than the debt could stay in the name
of the creditor after the two-year period. 9
All of this explains Eagleson's concern, expressed as soon as he had
won his case, that "whether I shall ever be able to levy this sum is
uncertain as their Estates cannot be sold in less than two Years after
Judgment."'4 His fears were misplaced. In December 1781 a public
auction was held in Halifax to dispose of the "Sundry real Estates" of
How, Gardner and MacGowan, which had been "taken by Execution at
the Suit of John Eagleson . . . . the term of Redemption . . . being
expired. '41 Eagleson himself bought the How lands, with Cumberland
loyalist J.P. Robert Scott purchasing those of Gardner.42
Harper had more problems, primarily because he found himself
confronted with "retaliatory" litigation by the local patriots, in particular
by one John Bent, who had been a member of the county's committee of
safety and been indicted for treason although he formally returned to his
allegiance in June 1777. In 1779, after Harper's suit was entered but
before it had been decided, Bent sued two of the defendants in Harper v.
Ayer et al, Clarke and Chester, in the Inferior Court of Common Pleas for
Cumberland county, sitting at Fort Lawrence. 43 Common Pleas was the
lower civil court, organised by county and by districts within counties and
presided over by non-legally trained locally-based judges." The osten-
sible basis of Bent's lawsuits was that he had lent money and provided
supplies to Clarke and Chester's families for their support after the men
had absconded or been captured, had billetted the families for a time, and
had helped them with passage money when allowed tojoin their adscording
husbands. Bent was brother-in-law to Simeon Chester, Chester having
39. At that point the creditor could take out another execution against any remaining property
of the debtor, or if there was none, have the debtor committed to prison.
40. Letter of Eagleson, 30 July 1779, in SPG Journals, MG 17, vol. 21, 671.
41. Nova Scotia Gazette, 25 Sept, and 2 and 16 Oct, 1781.
42. NSARM, Register of Deeds, RG 47, Reel 555, Nos. 173 and 185.
43. Unfortunately the records of the Fort Lawrence Inferior Court of Common Pleas have not
survived, but there is ample testimony as to the existence and timing of Bent's lawsuits: see the
Judgment Roll, Petition of Thomas Watson, and Answer of John Bent, all in RG 36, Series A,
No 82, from which all information about this case is taken unless otherwise specified. See also
the depositions of Christopher Harper, William Black, and Thomas Robinson, 23 June 1789,
in ibid.; and The Reply of Messrs Sterns and Taylor to the Answers Given by the Judges of the
Supreme Court of Nova Scotia... (Halifax, 1788) at 57.
44. There is unfortunately no comprehensive study of the operation of the Courts of Common
Pleas in Nova Scotia. A useful introductory survey is contained in J.B. Cahill, "Richard
Gibbon's 'Review' of the Administration of Justice in Nova Scotia, 1774" (1988) 37
U.N.B.L.J. 34.
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married his sister Elizabeth. Bent was successful, in early July 1780
receiving judgments against Clarke and Chester for c. £100 each.45
Bent therefore had claims against Clarke and Chester's lands and other
property that were dated prior to those obtained by Harper in the Halifax
Supreme Court. Some contemporaries argued that this litigation was both
collusive and based on spurious claims, all designed to prevent Harper
from seizing the absconders' lands. As the loyalist J.P. William Black put
it a few years later in a deposition in one of the later cases in this saga, "he
was .. . of opinion that the accounts then given in by John Bent against
Simeon Chester was done in a collusive manner to cover said estate for
Chester. '46 Assessing the validity of Bent's claims is made difficult by
the fact that most witnesses and commentators, in 1779-1780 and later,
can be identified with the loyalist or the patriot side. However, the record
is fairly clear about the fact that Bent did indeed incur expenses in helping
the families of Clarke and Chester in the months and years following the
failure of the siege. Testimony to this effect comes from friends of Bent
and former patriots like Alpheus Morse, Ephraim Church, and Bent's
brother Jesse. Morse, for example, stated that Bent "supplied Mrs.
Chester and Mrs. Clark with hay, wood and other things for the support
of their families. '47 It was not only Bent's former comrades in rebellion
who acknowledged that he had helped the Chester and Clarke families;
members of the loyalist community like John Atkinson of Fort Lawrence
and J.P. Thomas Robinson.also stated that, in Robinson's words, after
Chester absconded Bent "had supplied Mrs. Chester ...with some
necessaries." Atkinson deposed that after Clarke was captured "Mrs.
Clark was sometime with Captain Bums in the garrison," and that Bent
"paid him about £30 on account of Mrs. Clark."4
45. Against Clarke for £91 16s I Id and against Chester for £ 104 1 s 2d, in both cases for debt
and costs combined.
46. Deposition of William Black, 23 June 1789, RG 36, Series A, No 82. Thomas Lusby of
Amherst also insisted that "the suit instituted by John Bent was done in a collusive manner in
order to cover their property," and he also noted that Chester was "a man as clear of debt as any
of his neighbours" and had "as good a stock as any of his neighbours": Deposition of Thomas
Lusby, 24 June 1789, supra note 43. For others who argued that the entire proceedings were
fraudulent, see Petition of Thomas Watson, in ibid., and the assertions of Jonathan Stems, in
Collection of the Publications Relating to the Impeachment of the Judges of His Majesty's
Supreme Court of the Province of Nova Scotia (Halifax, 1788) at 20.
47. Depositions of Alpheus Morse, 24 June and 3 July 1789, of Ephraim Church, 24 June
1789, and of Jesse Bent, 25 June 1789, RG 36, Series A, No 82. Church claimed that in 1779
he had "delivered by order and on account of John Bent ... goods to the amount of £25 or
thereabouts to Mrs. Chester." Jesse Bent acknowledged that some of the money came from him.
48. Deposition ofJohn Atkinson, 25 June 1789, and Deposition of Thomas Robinson, 23 June
1789; see also Deposition of Samuel Gay, 24 June 1789, ibid.
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Thus it seems highly probable that Bent had indeed advanced money
and goods to the two families, a conclusion supported by the fact that it
would have been his natural duty to help his sister's family and by the fact
that he likely assisted other absconders' families as well.49 Indeed a
substantial number of the patriot community in Cumberland suffered
greatly in the aftermath of the siege, with crops and stock plundered.5"
Perhaps the amounts claimed by Bent were inflated," in order to prevent
them being satisfied by any personal property or by rents alone-that is,
to at least tie up Clarke's and Chester's assets for the two years that had
to pass before their lands could be sold, for at that point any surplus was
seizable by other creditors.52 The fact of some assistance nevertheless
appears undeniable. In addition, it should also be noted that Bent had to
persuade a loyalist bench of the validity of his claims. The lack of court
records means that we cannot say precisely who heard the case, but in
1779 the four men entitled to serve as I.C.C.P. judges were Edward
Barron, then commander at Fort Cumberland, and Yorkshiremen James
Law, Charles Dixon, and, interestingly, Harper.53 It seems rather unlikely
that Harper actually sat on this occasion, but those who did were his
friends and political allies. They would not have been sympathetic to
former patriots-Dixon, for example, had seen his house plundered by
the rebels in 1776 to finance the campaign.54 Perhaps they judged the case
as simply being one between a repentant former rebel-Bent-and
unregenerate traitors like Clarke and Chester. More likely they were little
more fond of Bent than of the others, but saw no way within the law to
deny his claims.
49. Ephraim Church and Robert Sharp both deposed that Samuel Sharp (Robert's brother)
owed Bent some £82 6s, of which Church himself had paid £43 to Bent. In addition, in 1779
loyalist James Law apparently paid Sharp £23 "on the account of John Bent": Depositions of
Church, Sharp, and Law, all 24 June 1789, supra note 47.
50. Depositions of Alpheus Morse, 24 June and 3 July, and of Jesse Bent, 25 June 1789, supra
note 47. For suggestions that there were still some cows on the Chester farm in 1778-1779 see
depositions of John Atkinson, 25 June 1789, and of Rhoda Terrace, 3 July 1789, supra note 47.
For the economic and political fate of the Cumberland rebels' families after the siege, see
Clarke & Phillips, supra note 2 at 192.
51. Part of Bent's claim was based on Morse having worked on the Chester lands and having
received payment for that from Bent. Deposition of Morse, 3 July 1789, RG 36, Series A, No 82.
52. Harper later claimed that this was actually the case despite any inflation: "at the time of
his [Bent] taking out the writs he might have satisfied [them] ... on... personal estate which
at that time was very considerable," Deposition of Christopher Harper, 23 June 1789, ibid.
53. See the commissions issued to these four men in RG 1, vol. 168,421, 469, 541 and 549.
54. Clarke, supra note I at 180.
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That the debts were genuine does not mean that the litigation was not
launched, in the words of deputy provost-marshall for Cumberland
Thomas Watson, who we will shortly see was very much a victim in all
of this, "in order to defeat and defraud ... Christopher Harper and...
prevent him from obtaining satisfaction for the damages he had sus-
tained. 55 It seems highly unlikely that Bent would have sued his friend
and relation by marriage in different circumstances, but in taking advan-
tage of the legal processes open to him he was merely being as opportu-
nistic as Harper. Nor does the genuineness of the debts mean that the
proceedings to obtain satisfaction of them were entirely above board.
They were surely "collusive" in the sense that probably nobody defended
Bent's actions. Indeed, there would have been nobody available to defend
them, for a married woman had no legal personality separate from her
husband, and could not contract debts on her own behalf-anybody
dealing with a married woman contracted with her husband. Thus the
money and services given to Judith Clarke and Elizabeth Chester repre-
sented debts of Parker Clarke and Simeon Chester respectively. In
addition, the actions were also probably collusive in the sense that the
wives provided Bent with the evidence he needed; there is some confu-
sion over the receipts given to Bent, but it does nonetheless seem clear that
they were not signed until July 1779, well after many of the advances were
made but only just after Harper had launched his suit.56
Having found for Bent, early in July 1780 the court issued him writs
of attachment against the Clarke and Chester lands (attachment desig-
nates property as being in the custody of the court for the purpose of
satisfying a debt).57 These were served by Watson on July 5 (Clarke
lands) and July 8 (Chester lands). News of all this quickly reached
Halifax, before the conclusion of Harper's suit later in the month. As soon
as the jury had given its verdict in favour of Harper, Thompson success-
fully moved for Bent's writs to be set aside, Chief Justice Finucane
apparently stating that he believed that the Common Pleas suits were
collusive. On July 27 the Supreme Court issued an order, stating its
findings that the suits had been started "collusively to cover the property"
of the defendants and that judgment had been obtained "by deceit of the
55. Petition of Thomas Watson, RG 39, Series A, No 82.
56. Deposition of Alpheus Morse, 24 June 1789, ibid.
57. This account of the proceedings in both courts is taken from documents in the case file
in Harper v. Ayer et al, RG 39, Series C, vol. 22; Short Brief of Cause, and Deposition of Hance
Baker, 25 June 1789, in RG 36, Series A, No 82; and Collection of the Publications, supra note
46 at 20.
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parties." It ordered that no lands should be seized based on Bent's writs
and that "writs of certiorari [should] ... go to the ... inferior court...
to remove all records" of "all ... causes and plaints instituted against any
of the present defendants" into the Supreme Court. 8
This was a strange action by Finucane. He appears only to have heard
from Harper's counsel, Thompson, and he issued the order preferring
Harper's claims to Bent's at exactly the same time that he ordered the
Common Pleas records to be brought up by certiorari-yet it was on this
record that he should have made his decision on the validity of Bent's
case. As we have seen, Bent's action was opportunistic but probably not
fraudulent. It appears likely, therefore, that Finucane was very sympa-
thetic to the attempts by 1776 loyalists to make good their losses, and
happy to bend procedural rules a little to that end. In any event, the order
was given to Harper, along with writs of execution dated 31 July 1780 to
satisfy both his judgments.
Harper took the documents to deputy provost-marshall for Halifax
William Shaw, obtained from him deeds transferring possession and title
to Harper subject to the equity of redemption and an order to Watson to
prefer Harper's claims over Bent's. So armed, Harper raced off to
Cumberland, arriving there as the Clarke and Chester lands were being
appraised for Bent, under the supervision of Watson. 9 Harper presented
Watson with the Supreme Court's order and the lands were then appraised
again, this time for Harper.
Events moved swiftly thereafter. We do not know what the appraisals
said,6° but we do know that property stated by Shaw to be worth almost
£700 was seized for Harper; most of this represented the value of lands
and fixtures seized (£583), with the rest made up of personal property
taken and sold. By saying that the lands were seized we mean that deeds
were given to Harper which still allowed the debtors to retrieve the land
by paying in full what was owed. Not only were the lands and personal
property of Clarke and Chester taken in this way, but those of Smith,
58. Certiorari literally means "to make certain," and is one of the prerogative writs. It was
used for a higher court to review the proceedings of any body actingjudicially: see Baker, supra
note 18 at 170-172; and L.L. Jaffe & E.G. Henderson, "Judicial Review and the Rule of Law:
Historical Origins" (1956) 72 L. Q. R. 345.
59. For the appraisal process, and the disputes surrounding it, see Petition of Thomas Watson,
Depositions of Thomas Robinson, 23 June, of William Black, 23 June, of Christopher Harper,
and of Alpheus Morse, 24 June 1789, in RG 36, Series A, No 82.
60. Other much later accounts suggested that the Clarke lands were worth, £4 per annum,
those of Chester £10 per annum. These figures for rent, of course, do not indicate what the
selling value would have been. Depositions of Thomas Lusby, 24 June, and of John Atkinson,
25 June 1789, ibid.
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Lawrence and Ayer were likewise acquired. The relevant values for lands
and fixtures seized were: Clarke, £132; Smith, £131 6s; Chester, £100;
Lawrence, £100; and Ayer £160. According to Shaw, £642 3s of the total
taken by execution was enough to satisfy the damages plus costs in the
trespass action, with £47 3s going towards the judgment in the suit in
trover and conversion.6'
At various times thereafter at least some of these lands were sold by
sheriff's sale following the expiry of the redemption period. Smith's
property was bought by loyalist J.P. Charles Dixon in 1785, Clarke's
went in the same year to Roger Robinson, son of J.P. Thomas, and
Chester's was acquired at an unknown time by one William Freeman.
62
There is no evidence about what happened to the other lands.
III. "Reduced to Wretched Indigence": Law, Politics and Power
in Cumberland, 1780-1785
Bent's attempts to stop Harper wreaking economic vengeance on the
former patriot community had failed, and apparently shortly thereafter he
decamped to New England and stayed there until after the passage of a
general amnesty in 1783.63 His initial success may have persuaded others
to follow his example, but there is only the slimmest evidence of that;6'
certainly his action was the only one by patriots which created a problem
for the enforcement of loyalist claims in the 1780s.
Bent left behind him a community increasingly fractured, and one in
which many members faced ruin. Not only did Harper's and Eagleson's
lawsuits impoverish a number of people, their success encouraged others
to go to law as well. In 1782 an inquiry into the state of the county reported
that "many inhabitants who took an active part with the rebels.., during
61. Harper v. Ayer et al, RG 39, Series C, vol. 22.
62. RG 47, Reel 555, Nos 340 and 360; Deposition of James Watson, 3 July 1789, and
Defence of John Bent, RG 36, Series A, No 82.
63. The amnesty statute is at S.N.S. 1783, c. 3. The assertion that Bent returned only after the
amnesty is from Jonathan Stems in Collection of the Publications, supra note 46 at 20, who
claimed to be informed of it by Watson. It seems unlikely that this would have been the reason
for Bent's return, for he had taken the oath of allegiance and was not under any threat of treason
proceedings. He may, however, have been induced to return by the passage of the 1783 statute
to adjust litigation losses, discussed below in this section.
64. One such suit may have been Sharp v. Allen and Chester (1778), which has come to our
attention only because the Supreme Court issued a writ of error in the case in 1778: RG 39,
Series J, vol. 98, 423. But it is rather early to be part of a retaliatory strategy. The only other
evidence for additional suits comes from Harper's later assertion that "[t]here were several law
suits commenced ... against the people that had been in arms ... on purpose to cover and
conceal their effects for making good the damages they had done the King's Subjects":
Deposition of Christopher Harper, 23 June 1789, in Watson v. Bent, RG 36, Series A, No 82.
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the time of the invasion in 1776 ... have since been harassed by law
prosecutions at the suits of Christopher Harper, John Eagleson and others
for damages ... sustained in the general devastation made ... by both
rebels and the British troops." The result was that "many... had had their
whole property seized and taken from them" so that they and their
families were "destitute of every support" as a result. Moreover, others
lived "under the Terror" of "the same Persecution" and "the continual
dread of being reduced to a Wretched Indigence."65 Such comments echo
the complaints of one former rebel, John Starr, who in 1779 was sent to
Nova Scotia by General Gates as a spy and who complained then that
"[m]any who are Friends to America have been prosecuted in Halifax and
judgement recovered against them in a very unjust manner by which
themselves and Familys are ruined."66 The rebellion may have been over,
and official retribution mild. But the legal system was yoked to a
substantial and long-lasting private retribution process.
Other evidence clearly indicates that there were a variety of suits other
than the major ones we have examined, and the existence, if not the
results, of many of them can be traced in the court records. The earliest
person to follow Eagleson's lead appears to have been Robert McClintock,
who successfully sued perhaps as many as 10 former patriots, most of
them members of Eddy's Pictou contingent.67 But most cases appear to
have been started in 1780-81 after Eagleson and Harper had so spectacu-
larly shown the way. Joseph Cossins sued 11 former patriots for £1,000
in damages, and while the court records do not indicate the result of the
case, Cossins did attach and then sell by public auction lands that once
belonged to one of the defendants, Josiah Throop.
68
65. Report of Supreme Court Judges Isaac Deschamps and James Brenton, 8 Sept 1782,
RG 1, vol. 221, No. 61.
66. John Starr to John Allan, 18 May 1779, in F. Kidder, Military Operations in Eastern
Maine and Nova Scotia During the Revolution (Albany, N.Y.: Joel Munsell, 1867) at 81. In fact
Starr's comments likely related only to the actions by Harper and Eagleson.
67. The record is a little confusing on this. In August 1779 eight men-Nathaniel Reynolds
of Amherst, Benjamin Allen, Richard Jones, and Jonathan Bramble of Baie Verte, Cumberland
County, and Daniel Earle, James Watson, Joseph Horton, and Dr. John Harris of Pictou-
apparently had their property formally attached in consequence of McClintock's action for
trespass in which he claimed damages of, 1,000: RG 39, Series J, vol. 99,22. Of these only the
case file for McClintock v. Earle (1779) could be located, and it includes a court order for the
sale of Earle's property by public auction. However, the same result was reached in two other
cases for which there are case files, McClintock v. James Fulton (1779) and McClintock v.
Matthew Harris (1779): RG 39, Series C, vol. 20.
68. RG 39, Series C, vol. 21, and Series J, vol. 99, 71; RG 47, Reel 555, No 77. The other
defendants were Alpheus Morse, Robert Foster, William Maxwell, Nehemiah Ayer, Samuel
Hicks, John Fillmore, Timothy Copp, Mathew Dickey, Elijah Freeman and Elijah Freeman Jr.
Most of these men had fled to New England after the siege, although some, including Morse,
returned to Cumberland later.
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Perhaps the most active litigant in these years was William Allan, an
extensive landowner in Cumberland county, successful Halifax busi-
nessman, and father of rebel leader John Allan although he remained
staunchly loyal and disowned his son. In 1781 he sued over a dozen
former patriots, including Charles Oulton, a defendant in Eagleson' s suit,
and Obadiah, the by-then deceased brother of Elijah Ayer Sr., in trespass
for plundering his property and destroying his buildings. He demanded
damages of £2,000. Ironically Allan's lawyer on this occasion was not
Thompson, who represented the other loyalists, but Richard J. Uniacke,
who had taken part in the rebellion on the patriot side, been captured, and,
in circumstances that are somewhat mysterious, obtained his release.69
Six of the defendants were personally served with a summons in Septem-
ber 1781, but Watson could not serve the others because five had
absconded, two were dead, and one was found not to exist. Unfortunately
there is no further record of the case.70 Allan also launched another action,
William Allan v. Robert MacGowan and Benjamin Reynolds, for £500. 7'
Allan also, it should be noted, had earlier sued some of the fort's 1776
defenders as well, winning an arbitrated award of over £400.72 His
actions were quite legitimate in that there is evidence that his property,
69. For Uniacke's role in the Eddy rebellion and his fate thereafter see Clarke & Phillips,
supra note 2 at 180 and 191.
70. For all of this see Allan v. Ayer et al., RG 39, Series C, vol. 23, and Series J, vol. 99, 78.
In addition to extensive tracts of farmland, Allan's property in Cumberland township consisted
of a "mansion house," eleven other "houses," and a number of barns and other structures;
descriptions of the property appear in the case file and in John Allan's Memorial to Congress,
26 March 1800, RG 1, vol. 364. Those served were Oulton, Elijah Freeman Sr, Elijah Freeman
Jr, Israel Thornton, Gideon Smith Sr, and Gideon Smith Jr. Zebulon Roe and Robert Forster,
major players in the events of 1776, were not in the jurisdiction, nor were Atwood Fales, John
Starr, or Nathaniel Reynolds. Amasa Killam and Obadiah Ayer were dead, and Allan
apparently sued a non-existent person, Thomas Thornton. Josiah Throop's name also appears
in one of the sources but not the other.
71. RG 39, Series J, vol. 99, 173.
72. In 1779 Allan sued at least six men who had been members of the Fort Cumberland
garrison in 1776: Goreham, Major Thomas Batt, J.P. James Law, engineers William Spry and
John Collett and Philip Baylie. He pleaded damages done to his house and lands, and for
plunder, and his demands ranged from £ 1,500 from Batt to £ 100 from Baylie. On this occasion
Allan was, like other loyalists, represented by George Thompson, while the attorney for at least
some of the defendants was solicitor-general James Brenton. While no result appears to have
been reached in the suits against Batt, Baylie, Collett and Law, the claim against Goreham went
by consent to arbitration in April 1780. The arbitrators set the total value of goods taken from
Allan and used for the fort at £407 and ordered that "as the aforesaid materials were applied
to the service of his majesty" they "ought to be paid for" by the crown and "not by the
defendant": see RG 39, Series J, vol. 99, 16-18, 23,46, 72 and 73, and Series C, vol. 19; James
Brenton Benchbook, Acadia University Archives (microfilm at NSARM), August 1782. See
also the successful small debt suit in Thomas Batt v. Joseph Goreham, RG 39, Series J, vol. 6,
p. 149 (1781).
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unfortunately located close to Fort Cumberland, had been plundered by
both sides.73
A variety of other cases were also begun in the Halifax Supreme Court
in this period, although they were not concluded, perhaps being settled
out of court. They included Joshua Winslow v. Jesse Bent, for a mere £30;
John McMonagle v. Mark Patton, for £100; and Joseph Goreham v.
Estate of Benoni Danks, for £300. 74 Other suits were likely prosecuted
locally in Common Pleas, for there are circumstantial references to two
such cases. It may be that these suits ground to a halt when the execution
process was suspended in the late summer of 1782, a matter discussed
below. Thus while the record is thin as to results, it is clear that other
members of the old loyalist community, besides Eagleson and Harper,
took their revenge on the rebels through the civil courts.
As they did so they exacerbated the social and politcal divisions in the
county and caused some to take the law into their own hands. One patriot
response to the loss of lands and other property was a resort to threats of
physical violence.7 6 Eagleson was sufficiently unpopular to be unable or
unwilling to venture out of Cumberland township during the next few
years, and to fear that if given the opportunity patriot forces would again
"carry him off a prisoner". 77 In some cases threats became reality, as
arson was indeed resorted to by patriots on a number of occasions. But
73. Goreham took fence rails and other lumber to shore up the fort's defences, and later on
during the siege Eddy burned many of Allan's buildings. Some of what remained was then
scavenged for fuel by members of the hard-pressed garrison: See Clarke, supra note I ch. 7.
74. RG 39, Series J, vol. 99, 71-72.
75. Thomas Ratchford sued Elijah Freeman in the Horton (King's County) Inferior Court,
and Ebenezer Barnham, Abel Peck, Robert Dickson and William Daniels sued the Proprietors
of Hopewell Township in the Cumberland Inferior Court of Common Pleas: Court Order,
I Sept 1782, RG 39, Series C, vol. 25. In addition at least one suit based on rebellion losses came
before the Supreme Court on circuit at Horton in May 1782: see Benchbook of James Brenton,
May 1782.
76. See for example an anonymous letter written in August or September 1780 to Watson. It
was said to come from "R. Revenge" of "Scrutiny River," and singled out Harper for his
"diabolical proceedings." Watson was warned to "desist from executing any instrument of
what name or nature so ever against any person or persons in your county who have been under
arms against the Fort"; if not he would "neither have house norbarn many days after." Halifax's
response was to offer a £ 100 reward for "the discovery of the author or authors of said letter":
Minutes, 22 Sept 1780, RG 1, vol. 189; Proclamation, RG 1, vol. 170, 307-308. See also
Eagleson's claim that "several anonymous seditious letters" were sent to "the Sheriff and other
executive Officers of justice," which threatened "to burn and destroy their property, and mal-
treat their persons, should they presume to execute any writ or verdict of the Courts... against
them": Letter of May 1781, in SPG Journals, MG 17, vol. 23, 257.
77. Letter of 7 May 1781, in SPG Journals, MG 17, vol. 23, 258-259.
460 The Dalhousie Law Journal
abuses were by no means only perpetrated by former patriots, and ex-
loyalists were just as ready with the torch."
By mid-1782 the situation in Cumberland county gained sufficient
notoriety that the Assembly demanded ajudicial inquiry into the "oppres-
sive measures" which "have been exercised towards the Inhabitants of
Cumberland." The resolution particularly complained of "sundry judg-
ments surreptitiously obtained against the estates of absentees and
others," and asked for executions consequent on those judgments to be
suspended. 79 The requested inquiry was undertaken by Supreme Court
judges James Brenton and Isaac Deschamps, who visited the county in the
summer of 1782 on the resumption of the Supreme Court circuit there.
During their time in Cumberland they seem to have heard what were
effectively appeals in "a variety of law causes" and "adjusted" matters
"consistent with the principles of law and justice," sometimes by court
orders and sometimes by putting the cases tojuries.8 ° In addition, shortly
after returning to Halifax, they ordered the cessation of all executions
consequent on loyalist suits.8
In addition to tinkering with particular cases, the judges recommended
the removal of Harper from the commission of the peace and from his
judicial offices, for they concluded that he had "in a variety of instances
been guilty of violent and oppressive measures against a number of
inhabitants," and that those people had "great reason" to complain about
"the injuries and oppressions they have suffered under the abuse of his
Authority." The judges unfortunately did not elaborate, although one
example of these "oppressions" was likely the illegal seizure of cattle
belonging to Isaac Danks, whose late father Benoni Danks had been a
78. Victims of arson included Christopher Harper. In 1788 his house, which happened to be
Elijah Ayer's old house and was by then in New Brunswick, was burned to the ground. Other
victims included Stephen Millidge: Millidge to Ward Chipman, 23 Jan. 1788, New Brunswick
Museum, Hazen Collection, FI, Packet 6; see Clarke, supra note 3 at 57.
79. Journals of the House of Assembly [hereafter Assembly Journals], 27 June 1782.
80. Report of Supreme Court Judges, 8 Sept 1782, RG 1, vol. 221, No. 61. All quotations
which follow are from this report unless otherwise stated. The judges may have been referring,
when they talked of putting matters to juries, to disputes about the value of lands seized in
execution. One defendant certainly claimed later that Harper had received much more value
than the damages awarded. When applying for compensation from the American government
in the late 1790s Ayres submitted documents stating that while he had only been credited with
lands worth £160, it was worth £500 at the time of seizure. Of course, he may well have been
gilding the lily for higher compensation: see Letter from the Commissioners Appointed
Pursuant to the Act Entitled an Act for the Relief of the Refugees from the British Provinces of
Canada and Nova Scotia, enclosing certain documents relative to the claims of Elijah Ayer,
deceased, and Elijah Ayer, Jr. (Washington, 1802) at 25-27.
81. Supreme Court Order, I Sept 1782, RG 39, Series C, vol. 25.
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leading patriot; Isaac won a civil judgment against Harper for this. 2 But
if we do not know exactly what was meant by the judges, two cases give
some indication of how the loyalist J.P.s were wont to act towards former
patriots. In one 1783 incident a newly-arrived New York loyalist, Captain
Kipp, assisted by three armed men, ejected from his house and lands
Moses Desledernier, whose loyalty in 1776 had been suspect at best.
Successive appeals by Desledernier to J.P.s Harper, James Law and
Charles Dixon went unheeded, although Desledernier eventually was
able to have Captain Edward Barron, a J.P. and the commander at Fort
Cumberland, intervene on his behalf.
8 3
Our second incident occurred much later, but it is evocative of the
problems of the early 1780s. In 1795 Christopher Harper, never one to let
matters drop, sued Josiah Throop for £3, the basis of the debt being an
alleged delivery of grain that Harper had made to Throop in 1775! By then
both men were residents of Westmoreland County, N.B., and the small
debt case came within the jurisdiction of a single J.P. That J.P. turned out
to be Charles Dixon, who was in the Cumberland commission in the early
1780s. Harper had no documentary evidence, Throop claimed he had paid
for the grain, and the debt, if it existed, was 20 years old. None of this
hindered Dixon, who found for Harper. When asked to explain his action
by way of a writ of certiorari issued by the New Brunswick Supreme
Court, Dixon acknowledged that "the credibility of [the litigants']...
testimony was all the ground I had to go upon". That of course made the
case easy, for Dixon was "intimately acquainted" with both men and was
also aware of the fact that Throop had been "secretary to Colonel Eddy"
and after the siege "to save his neck [had] run off to the States." Moreover,
Dixon knew Throop, knew he was "at that time... very poor" and "never
forward in paying debts." Finally, Throop had offered no proof of
payment.8 4 In such circumstances Dixon's claim that he "acted from
principle not prejudice" rings somewhat hollow, and suggests the kinds
of ways in which he and others might have behaved a dozen or so years
previously when the memory of rebellion was much fresher.
82. Danks v. Harper (1781), RG 39, Series J, vol. 6, 156 and vol. 99, 86.
83. From Dixon Delesdernier got the response that "the Capt. had very good credentials" and
that "he [Dixon] could say nothing to my Character, indeed he could say nothing in the matter
at all." Law protested that "he did not know how to proceed as the Captain was a stranger just
arrived," and Harper claimed that he simply did not know what to do: Deposition of Moses
Delesdernier, July 1783, RG 1, vol. 223, No 7; see also ibid., No 8. Desledernier also appealed
to the Governor in Chancery: Petition of Moses Frederick Desledernier, 2 Aug 1783, RG 36,
Series A, No. 60.
84. Harper v. Throop, (1795) Provincial Archives of New Brunswick [hereinafter PANB],
RS 42.
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Despite incidents such as these the judges' recommendation to do
something about the J.P.s was not acted on immediately in 1782, although
they were later censured over the Delesdernier affair, and Harper was
removed from the commission." Nor were Deschamps' and Brenton's
recommendations about dealing with the most serious problem in the
county-the economic consequences of the loyalist civil litigation-
taken up in 1782. In a tone distinctly sympathetic to the former patriots,
thejudges noted that some of the 1776 rebels had only taken part "through
fear and compulsion," and now faced the "evil" of ruinous civil litigation.
Their suggested solution was the appointment of "three or more judicious
and impartial men" to calculate all losses and "apportion the whole
equitably upon such of the inhabitants or their estates as were any ways
concerned in supported or aiding the rebels." In this way compensation
"would fall on a number, and not be laid on a few." There were certainly
precedents for this kind of post-rebellion redistribution in British his-
tory,8 6 and Brenton and Deschamps claimed that such a scheme was
widely supported, with "even some of those who had recovered judge-
ments" being "willing to relinquish their executions, and to share in
common with others."
Although the judges' report asserted that the idea of apportionment of
losses had the support of both factions in Cumberland, it was not adopted
in 1782. The following year, however, a statutory solution to the problem
was at last achieved. Unfortunately there is no record of debates around
this measure, and no committee reports or other sources to enable us to
say more about it. Had such existed they would undoubtedly have greatly
enriched our knowledge not just of the statute but of all the events of the
previous few years.
The statute of 1783 recorded the Assembly's conviction that persons
who had successfully launched suits for losses "sustained... by reason
of the depredations of the enemy" had actually received judgments "for
a much greater amount than the losses really sustained," and that "the
85. Minutes, 22 Aug 1783, RG 1, vol. 189. Harper later became aJ.P. in New Brunswick: see
E. Clarke, "Christopher Harper: Loyalist" (1986) 24 Loyalist Gazette 16. Ironically Delesdemier
himself was appointed a J.P. for the county the following year: Minutes, 29 March 1784,
RG l, vol. 190. Later in 1783, on October 20, Uniacke moved for the dismissal also from the
Commission of the Peace of Dixon, Law and William Black. When this produced no response
an Assembly resolution of November 18 adverted to the continuing "discontents" in the county,
which was blamed on "the Misconduct of many of those who have been heretofore intrusted
with Commissions for the Administration of Justice," and requested again the dismissal of J.P.s
Dixon and Black: Assembly Journals, 20 Oct and 18 Nov 1783; Minutes, 12 Jan 1784, RG 1,
vol. 190.
86. See Pennington, supra note 23 at 125, and Fraser, Cromwell at 497.
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manner in which the said judgments have been carried into execution is
grievous and oppressive" because "the estates of a few individuals [had]
... been wholly seized to satisfy the same."87 The statute further provided
for the apportionment of liability recommended by the judges the
previous year. Three commissioners would be appointed in each county
to receive claims and hold hearings, and then report to the Chief Justice
"the amount of the real losses of each person or persons, who have
recovered judgments" and "a list of the persons.., who ought properly
to be charged with the payment of such losses." Other provisions tried to
deal with those who had already received excessive judgments in their
favour. The Commissioners' reports were to be filed in the Halifax
Supreme Court for a term, and thereafter the judges would decide, by
comparing actual losses with amounts received in lawsuits, whether any
judgments had been "surreptitiously obtained" or whether any litigant
had "by ... unfair means, recovered more than the value of the real losses
... sustained." The court could also decide if there were other inhabitants,
presumably those who had escaped lawsuits, who ought to make a
contribution to the losses bill. In any of these circumstances the court
could set aside existing judgments and order the "real losses" of such
people to be made good by all those considered by the commissioners to
be chargeable for rebellion losses. The final section of the Act suspended
the operation of all current suits and executions.
While the 1783 statute attempted a partial reform of the Cumberland
legal system, it should be noted that it also confirmed the principle that
otherwise forgiven individuals should provide compensation to loyalists.
Moreover, it did so at the same time that the British government was
putting into operation its scheme for compensating loyalists who had lost
lands in the newly-independent American states. In June 1783 the
Loyalist Claims Commission was established, and the work of assessing
claims and making compensatory payments and land grants went on in
London and in the British North American colonies until 1790.88 One of
those successful in making a claim was Christopher Harper.89
87. An Actfor the Relief of Sundry of His Majesty's Subjects in this Province, against whom
Judgments have been recovered, on account of Losses sustained by the Depredations of the
Enemy, S.N.S. 1783, c. 2.
88. For the Loyalist Claims Commission see generally H.E. Egerton, ed., The Royal
Commission on the Losses and Services of American Loyalists, 1783-1785 (London: Oxford
University Press, 1915); W. Brown, The King's Friends: The Composition and Motives of the
American Loyalist Claimants (Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1965). The reports
of the commissioners are reproduced in Second Report of the Bureau of Archives for the
Province of Ontario (Toronto: Archives of Ontario, 1905).
89. Clarke, supra note 3 at 57.
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It may well have been the existence of this imperial compensation
scheme that was partly responsible for what appears to have been a
dilatory and half-hearted approach to putting the local one into operation.
In fact, we know very little about the working of the local statute. The
commission authorized by it was not established until late in 1784.90 It
must have done something, for the Supreme Court judges' role in the
apportionment process led to one of the charges in their attempted
impeachment by a coterie of newly-arrived loyalist lawyers in the later
1780s. Specifically, Deschamps and Brenton were accused of having
acted in a "partial and shameful Manner" in settling apportionment
matters, and of favouring "the side of the Rebels against the King's Loyal
Subjects." Chief Justice Finucane, it was alleged, had also been guilty,
not of direct preference for rebels but of resisting complaints about his
puisnejudges. 9 This was a strange charge given his precipitate favouring
of Harper in 1780, but it probably resulted from his patronage, from 1781,
of fellow Irishman and Cumberland rebel Richard John Uniacke.92 It is
perfectly reasonable to suggest that Finucane was simply unwilling to
brook the improprieties and abuses of loyalists. Unfortunately, no records
of the apportionment process have survived, and thus there is no evidence
about what it actually achieved. Moreover, to rely on the evidence of the
judges' opponents is to give dubious preeminence to the views of men-
new, post-1783 loyalists-who were struggling for power and prefer-
ment in their new home and who were never averse to painting any old
resident as a rebel or rebel sympathizer.
IV. Postscript: John Bent, Thomas Watson, and
the Court of Chancery
The story should end here, a decade after a small band of armed
Cumberland residents made their ultimately insignificant contribution to
the great imperial schism. But it does not, for the Cumberland rebellion
provided yet more work for the courts. Litigation continued between
Harper and Ayer, for example, over the Ayer lands, in the courts of New
90. It was comprised of Jotham Gay, Thomas Scurr, and George Foster, all of Cumberland:
Minutes, 8 Dec 1784, RG 1, vol. 190.
91. Halifax Journal, March 1788, reproduced in Collection of the Publications, supra note
46 at 11. For more on the contextof these complaints, see the section below on thej udges' affair.
92. For Finucane's relationship with Uniacke, and the criticism that it engendered in some
quarters, see J.B. Cahill, " 'Fide et fortitudine vivo': The Career of Chief Justice Bryan
Finucane" (1986) 42 Collections of the Royal N.S. Hist. Soc. 150 at 157-158.
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Brunswick.93 More importantly, John Bent re-entered the picture. It will
be remembered that in 1780 his attempts to have the Clarke and Chester
lands seized pursuant to his judgments failed, and that he decamped to
New England. At some point he returned, and in 1786 he successfully
applied to the Cumberland Inferior Court of Common Pleas for an alias
execution consequent on his 1780 judgements; an alias execution was
one issued after the original one had been returned without achieving its
purpose.
94
It is a mystery how the court could issue the executions; surely the
imbroglio over the lands was well known in the community, even if a
search of the title did not reveal that they had already been seized for
Harper and sold by him to others. Nonetheless, on orders of the court,
Charles Baker, sheriff of Cumberland County, had the lands appraised
(by Alpheus Morse and Ephraim Church, who would surely have known
about the previous dealings, and one Nathan Traverse), and attempted to
get the occupiers, David Pugsley who rented the former Chester lands
from William Freeman, and Roger Robinson, the owner of the former
Clarke lands, to attom to Bent.
95 Pugsley did so but Robinson refused,
96
at which point Baker seems to have become aware for the first time that
the lands had already been sold. A relative newcomer to the county, Baker
decided that "he had been too fast." He spoke to Bent, who apparently told
him that "he did not wish to bring [Baker]... into any difficulty," and that
if it seemed to Baker that the lands had already been sold he, Bent, "would
not insist on his [Baker] doing anything that he did not think himself
perfectly safe in." 97 Baker then returned the executions into court with a
notation to the effect that "the late sheriff had given a deed as of fee to
Christopher Harper," and that "at the request of the plaintiff [Bent]," he
"stayed any further proceedings."
93. See Harper v. Elijah Ayer and Nehemiah Ayer (1785); Harper v. Elijah Ayer and
Nehemiah Ayer (1787); and Harper v. Elijah Ayer and Nehemiah Ayer (1789); Ayer v. Harper
(1808), all at P.A.N.B., RS 42; Affidavit of Stephen Millidge, 21 Sept 1798, in Letterfrom the
Commissioners, supra note 80 at 27.
94. This section on the 1786 proceedings is drawn from Petition of Thomas Watson,
Depositions of Thomas Robinson, 23 June, of Alpheus Morse, 24 June, of David Pugsley, 23
June, of Charles Baker, 23 and 25 June 1789, all in Watson v. Bent, RG 36, Series A, No 82;
Reply of Sterns and Taylor, supra note 43 at 58.
95. Attornment was the process by which a tenant accepted the higher estate of a new
landlord. Tenants were required by provincial statute, on pain of prosecution for forcible
detainer, to attorn to those who obtained either title or the rights to the rents through executions
for judgment debt: see An Act for making Lands and Tenements liable to the payment of debts,
S.N.S. 1758, c. 15, ss. l and 2, and An Act to explain and amend .... S.N.S. 1763, c. 8.
96. Pugsley attorned to Bent and paid him a shilling, "which Bent returned him immediately."
He also agreed to a rent of £10per annum to be paid to Bent, although he never paid it.
97. Deposition of Charles Baker, 25 June 1789, in Watson v. Bent, RG 36, Series A, No 82.
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The ease with which Bent gave up on enforcing his executions
suggests that his purpose was not to get the lands, which he presumably
knew was impossible, but to sue Thomas Watson, the man who had
refused to levy his executions initially. Whether this was planned in 1786
or not, the fact is that on 25 July 1787 he commenced a suit against Watson
in the Supreme Court at Amherst, before Isaac Deschamps sitting alone,
complaining that Watson had not executed the writs he was supposed to
from the 1780 judgments and demanding £300 in damages.98 On its face
this was a perfectly legitimate suit, an action against a sheriff (or an
equivalent officer of the court) for not having levied an execution.
However, Watson's attorney, Amos Botsford, offered two principal
defences. First, he argued that Bent's action was statute barred, being
launched more than six years after the cause of action arose. 99 Second, he
asserted that Watson could hardly be liable for non-feasance because he
had relied on the Supreme Court's order that he execute Harper's writs in
preference to any others. While these might seem very good arguments,
especially the latter, Bent was successful in August 1787, the court
awarding him £283 16s in damages and issuing an execution against
Watson's property to satisfy the judgment. 00 According to Watson the
court made its decision without referring the matter to the jury and "in a
private and secret manner," not in open court. Watson alleged later that
he only found out that the decision had gone against him when "the sheriff
came to him with an execution." While Bent threatened to make good on
the execution, there is no evidence that he actually did so.
It is difficult to explain this proceeding, as the court records have not
survived. We get some help, however, from the fact that in the late 1780s
and early 1790s this piece of Cumberland rebellion litigation played a
small role in another cause cjlbre in Nova Scotia's history, the so-called
"judges' affair." This was the ultimately unsuccessful attempt by the
Assembly to impeach Judges Deschamps and Brenton on the grounds that
98. There are no records from the Supreme Court sitting at Amherst. This paragraph on the
1787 suit is taken from Judgment Roll and Answer of John Bent in ibid., and from documents
reproduced in Reply of Sterns and Taylor, supra note 43 at 17-18, 22 and 56-59, and Collection
of the Publications, supra note 46 at 16 and 20.
99. This was an action of "trespass on the case," and the six-year limitation period was
laid down in An Act for Limitation of Actions, and for avoiding Suits of Law, S.N.S. 1758,
c. 24, s. 4.
100. This total was comprised of £195 18 for the original judgements against Clarke and
Chester, £81 18 for interest since 1780, and costs.
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they had acted partially and/or incompetently in a series of cases.' 0' The
details of the affair do not concern us; what does matter is that in two ways
the complaints against the judges overlapped with our story. First, the
judges were early on accused of being partial to those who had served on
the patriot side in 1776 when they carried out their duties under the 1783
apportionment statute. This did not, however, form the basis of any of the
articles of impeachment against them.1
0 2
Second, and more importantly, it was asserted that thejudges had acted
incorrectly in Bent v. Watson, which was one of the sixteen cases
specifically complained of by the judges' opponents. Indeed it repre-
sented the fifth formal article of impeachment of seven presented to the
Assembly in April 1790.'0° The principal complaints were that the judges
had, as Sterns put it, "punished an officer for obeying'their Orders, who
was entirely under their Controul, and could have been fined and
imprisoned at their Discretion for not obeying them," and that they had
assessed damages themselves and not employed a jury when a "trial by
Jury" was "the known and Darling Privilege of Englishmen."' 04
The judges' response to the complaints concerning Bent v. Watson is
instructive.0 5 First, they asserted that the court order issued in July 1780
to prefer Harper's claims to Bent's was "particularly directed" by the late
Chief Justice Finucane. Second, they argued that "the whole cause rested
upon" the limitations question, and was therefore "a question of law."
That is, "whether the statute would run upon an action against the sheriff,
for not levying money on execution, where he might have done it." The
court decided that "as the debt was founded on a judgment, and a matter
101. The leading critics of the judges were two loyalist refugee lawyers, Jonathan Stems
and William Taylor, although they had numerous allies among other members of the profession
and, ultimately, in the Assembly. The best account of it is J.B. Cahill, "The Judges' Affair:
An Eighteenth Century Nova Scotia Cause C6lbre" (unpublished ms., 1986). The following
account of the role of Cumberland rebellion litigation in the judges' affair is based on
Cahill and on Collection of the Publications, supra note 46 and Reply of Sterns and Taylor,
supra note 43.
102. Halifax Journal, March 1788, reproduced in Collection of the Publications, supra
note 43 at 11.
103. For the articles see Cahill, "Judges' Affair" at 236-25 1.
104. Collection of the Publications, supra note 46 at 20-21. Stems and Taylor also com-
plained about the fact that the judges had allowed interest on the money owing from the time
that Watson had failed to serve the first execution, whereas they had consistently refused to do
so in other cases except under special circumstances. This last accusation is really not relevant
to us here, as it involved a difference of legal opinion about how closely the law as laid down
by the English courts should be followed.
105. Judges' Responses addressed to Governor Parr, reproduced in Reply of Sterns and
Taylor, supra note 43 at 18-19.
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of record, the statute could not bar." The judges also claimed that
Botsford, Watson's attorney, "was very well satisfied, and acquiesced in
the opinion of the court." Moreover, in such circumstances there was no
need for a jury either to decide the substantive issue or to assess the
damages.
There are a number of obvious problems with this defence. First, there
appears to be an implicit argument that it was somehow acceptable for the
court in 1787 effectively to impugn the order of July 1780 because it was
the particular work of Finucane and thus the unjustifiable product of his
personal prejudices. Deschamps and Brenton presented no evidence for
this assertion, and Deschamps had also sat on Harper v. Ayer et al and
signed the order. As the judges' critics rightly argued, the order in
question "purports to be an order made in and by the Supreme Court," and
there was "not... the smallest pretence for ascribing it to the Chief Justice,
more than to any other judge."'
0 6
Second, the judges were incorrect on the limitations point, for they
based their decision on the notion that Bent was simply trying to collect
a debt found valid by a court, and in such an instance there is no limitation
period. This was (and is) true, for limitations govern only the period of
time in which a plaintiff must sue after the cause of action has accrued.
But the judges' argument misstated the issue, for Bent was not trying to
collect a judgment debt from Clarke or Chester more than six years after
a decision; rather, he was suing on an entirely separate matter, the failure
of the officer charged with the responsibility of collecting the debt to do
so.'017 If there was a cause of action at all in the case it arose in August 1780
when Watson refused to levy the executions, and the period for suing on
that expired in August 1786. Ironically, Bent himself later claimed that
the limitation period did not apply, not for the reasons ascribed by the
judges, but because he had first sued Watson in August 1786, which he
said was within the limitation period.10
The most significant part of the judges' response in 1788, however,
was what they did not say. Their reply entirely fails to deal with the fact
that Watson was being sued because he obeyed a Supreme Court order.
The court, differently constituted, had issued conflicting decisions seven
years apart. This should have given the court two reasons for rejecting
106. Reply of Sterns and Taylor, ibid. at 22.
107. As Stems and Taylor correctly pointed out in response, Watson's failure to collect the
debt owed by Clarke and Chester to Bent did not create a debt between Watson, even if he was
a negligent collector, and Bent: Reply of Sterns and Taylor, ibid. at 19-21.
108. Answer of John Bent, RG 36, Series A, No 82.
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Bent's suit. First, it could have been argued that the matter was subject to
the doctrine of issue estoppel-the issue of the validity of Bent's
executions had been decided already and he was effectively trying to re-
litigate exactly the same point."° Second, and more importantly, given
that Watson had simply obeyed an order of the court it is impossible to see
how he could have been liable for non-feasance at all even if the issue
went to a trial. Stems and Taylor made this point, noting that Watson had
been found liable by the judges for "a nonfeasance in office," but the
failure complained of had been "occasioned... when he was bona fide
acting under their own order."' ' 0
Given all this, it is very difficult to discern why Deschamps made the
decision he did. He was not a supporter of the patriot fraction, but had
been able to overcome his political feelings towards them in the early
1780s when he saw first hand the loyalist abuses of power in Cumberland.
This does not mean that he became a closet republican, only that he
disliked the injustice in this instance. The critics' charges that the judges
acted in a partial manner in relation to particular individuals on other
occasions likely had more substance, particularly in regard to persons
represented in court by Sterns and Taylor and those who supported
them.I' Thus an explanation might be the bench's dislike of Watson, for
another case complained of, Cousins v. Watson, also involved an appar-
ently statute-barred suit against Watson which was nonetheless allowed
to proceed. 112 But there is no evidence of why the judges should have had
an animus against this one individual. It may be that, in the end, it was not
partiality but incompetence that decided Watson v. Bent. It may also be
the case, although this is not the subject of this essay, that Watson v Bent,
with its evidence of incompetence and its political overtones, lent a
particular force to the campaign against the judges. While that campaign
had much to do with newly-arrived loyalist lawyers' ambitions, it also
represented genuine dissatisfaction with the administration of justice.
The new loyalists were used to closer attention to the rule of law, and
109. Strictly speaking this could not be considered resjudicata, for at that time one needed
both the same issue and the same parties for such a finding.
110. Reply of Sterns and Taylor, supra note 43 at 21. In a rhetorical flourish they also asserted
that Deschamps "had give[n] up... the power of discrimination between right and wrong," that
this was a "flagrant" case of injustice in which any fair man would have been astute "to have
found out some legal grounds on which they might have protected this honest and injured man":
ibid. at 36.
111. For a review of the many cases complained of see Cahill, "Judges' Affair," supra
note 101. This is not Cahill's judgment, but ours, based on that account.
112. See Cahill, "Judges' Affair," ibid. at 157.
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Watson v. Bent must have seemed a particularly egregious example of
how it was lacking in Nova Scotia.
All of this aside, the fact is that Watson lost in 1787, and his options
were limited. Decisions of the Supreme Court in civil cases could only be
appealed to the Governor and Council as a Court of Error where the matter
in dispute was £300 or more. Watson's only recourse was to seek an
injunction in the Court of Chancery to prevent Bent making any use of his
rights acquired at common law in the Supreme Court. The history of the
relationship between courts of common law and the court of equity, or
Chancery, in the English legal system is a long and complex one." 13 The
principal feature of it for our purposes is that Chancery had since the
thirteenth century operated as a parallel system of justice to the common
law courts, recognizing causes of action not available at common law and
providing remedies supplementary to the law. The most important
equitable remedy was the injunction, a device which exemplifies both
Chancery procedure and the theory on which equity was based.' A
person who had lost in a court of common law was able to go to equity and
argue that the successful litigant should not be able, as a matter of "good
conscience," to enforce his or her legal rights. The court (the Chancellor,
a royal minister initially but later the title of the judge of the Court of
Chancery) investigated the matter through an inquisitorial procedure
rather than holding an adversarial hearing. If the court agreed that the case
was one suitable for intervention, it would not purport to overturn the
ruling of the common law court, but would issue an injunction telling the
defendant not to enforce rights acquired there. Equity thus operated in
theory as merely supplementary to the law, but in effect as a kind of appeal
court. Over the centuries the kinds of circumstances which would invoke
equitable intervention became regularized,' 'I even to some extent ossi-
fied, and the court lost much of its ability to intervene in a purely
discretionary manner "whenever equity and good conscience required."
The colony of Nova Scotia was given an equitablejurisdiction from the
founding of Halifax in 1749, although for many years, until the appoint-
113. For the general history of equity see, inter alia, Baker, supra note 18, ch. 6.
114. In this account we use the terms "Court of Equity" and "Court of Chancery" interchange-
ably, which is correct. Note also that in all historical and modem accounts "equity" is used to
mean either the court, or the rules which came to define jurisdiction, that is, when the court
would intervene, or to indicate, in a manner consistent with colloquial understandings, a
general sense of fairness and justice.
115. Chancery came to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over, among others, trusts, the
administration of estates, partnership, guardianship, custody, and the foreclosure of mortgages.
The last category accounts for the vast majority (76 per cent) of cases during the existence of
the Nova Scotia Chancery Court: see J. Cruikshank, "The Chancery Court of Nova Scotia:
Jurisdiction and Procedure, 1751-1855" (1992) 1 Dal. J. of Legal Studies 27 at 33.
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ment of a Master of the Rolls in 1825, the Governor remained the central
figure in the Chancery Court." 6 As the court's leading modern historian
has noted, "[a]n action in Chancery was often nothing more than a covert
appeal from a judgment of the superior common law court," for "the
scope of equitable relief was broad enough to include miscarriages of
justice in the Supreme Court.""' 7
This was the avenue pursued by Watson. Represented by Attorney-
General Sampson Salter Blowers, he applied to the Governor as Chancel-
lor in September 1787, immediately receiving an interim injunction
barring Bent from enforcing hisjudgment." 8 His formal prayer for relief
in the form of a permanent injunction argued that the Supreme Court
judgment in Bent's favour was clearly contrary to law but that as there
was no appeal (for a matter less than £300) his only recourse was to the
"equity and good conscience" of the Governor as Chancellor. In the body
of the application he recounted the circumstances of the Harper and Bent
suits, the difficult choice he had been faced with in 1780 in having two
sets of executions and an order from the Supreme Court to prefer one set
over another, and the fact that he had done what he thought was necessary
and that Bent had apparently accepted this for 7 years. He then com-
plained that the 1787 suit launched by Bent was instituted when "most of
the witnesses, parties and actors who had knowledge, had been concerned
in, and were privy to" the original events were "either dead or absent from
116. The history of Nova Scotia's Chancery court is well-reviewed in Cruikshank, "The
Chancery Court of Nova Scotia"; J.B. Cahill, "Bleak House Revisited: The Records and Papers
of the Court of Chancery of Nova Scotia, 1751-1855" (1989-1990) 29 Archivaria 149, and
"From Imperium to Colony: Reinventing a Metropolitan Legal Institution in Late Eighteenth-
Century Nova Scotia," in D.W. Nichol et al., eds., Transatlantic Crossings: Eighteenth
Century Explorations (St. John's: Memorial University of Newfoundland 1995); P.V. Girard,
"Married Women's Property, Chancery Abolition, and Insolvency Law: Law Reform in Nova
Scotia, 1820-1867," in Girard & J. Phillips, eds., Essays in the History of Canadian Law
Volume Three: Nova Scotia (Toronto: University of Toronto Press and Osgoode Society for
Canadian Legal History, 1990) at 106-113. An older but still partially useful account is
C.J. Townshend, History of the Court of Chancery in Nova Scotia (Toronto: Carswell, 1900).
For another account of a Chancery case in Nova Scotia see P.V. Girard, "Taking Litigation
Seriously: The Market Wharf Controversy at Halifax, 1785-1820" in G.B. Baker & J. Phillips,
eds., Essays in the History of Canadian Law Volume VIII: In Honour of R.C.B. Risk
(forthcoming, University of Toronto Press and Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal
History, 1999).
117. Cahill, "Bleak House Revisited," ibid. at 151. Note, however, that recourse to the court
for this or any other purpose was not common, for the average case load of the court in the
eighteenth century was four cases a year. Watson's suit was one of three launched in 1789:
Cruikshank, "Chancery Court of Nova Scotia," supra note 115 at 30-31.
118. The progress of Watson's Chancery suit can be followed in RG 36, vol. 75 (C); RG 39,
Series J, vol. 72, 8. Watson's petition, Bent's defence, and the written testimony of witnesses
are all contained in RG 36, Series A, No 82.
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[the] . . .province." The suit, said Watson, was intended to "vex and
injure" him.
Bent was able to obtain the services of solicitor-general Richard J.
Uniacke for this case, an ironic choice given that Uniacke had also spent
time in jail in 1777 following involvement in the Cumberland insurrec-
tion. Bent's denial included an assertion that the 1787 Supreme Court
judgment in his favour was not given in secret, but otherwise he admitted
the story of the proceedings as given by Watson. For some reason,
perhaps the mounting crisis of the attempted judicial impeachment,
nothing appears to have happened through 1788, but in March 1789 the
Court issued a commission to three Cumberland J.P.s to take written
evidence; Bent chose Charles Baker, Watson chose William Black, and
the court itself added George Foster. The commissioners collected
testimony on 23, 24 and 25 June, and 3 July 1789, at the Amherst
courthouse. Statements were taken on Watson's behalf from Christopher
Harper, William Black, Thomas Robinson, Hance Baker, David Pugsley,
John Atkinson, Thomas Lusby, James Watson (son of Thomas), and
Rhoda Terrace, formerly servant to the Chester family. On Bent's behalf
the evidence of Ephraim Church, Samuel Gay, Jesse Bent, James Law,
Alpheus Morse, and Robert Sharp was taken. This evidence was returned
to the court in August, and another delay ensued before oral hearings took
place in February 1790. Governor Parr eventually, and not surprisingly,
found for Watson in June 1790, issuing a permanent injunction against
Bent enforcing what he had won at common law. Any sympathy for Bent
was limited to a refusal to give Watson costs.
Conclusion
With the Governor/Chancellor's decision the principal part of the rebel-
lion-related litigation from Cumberland County-the suits begun in the
late 1770s by Eagleson and Harper-came to an end. While we must be
wary of drawing too many general conclusions from what is essentially
one case study, this account does allow a glimpse of both the operation
of the legal system in early Nova Scotia and the role of law in that society.
With regard to the former, we can, to some extent, find support for
contemporary criticisms about the quality of civil justice in the colony, 119
119. We refer here both to the "judges' affair," discussed above, and also to the kinds of
criticisms, albeit centered on the lower civil courts, made by James Monk Jr. and Richard
Gibbons Jr. in the mid 1770s: see Cahill, "Richard Gibbon's 'Review'," supra note 44 and the
same author's "James Monk's 'Observations on the Courts of Law in Nova Scotia', 1775"
(1987) 36 U.N.B.L. J. 131.
"The Course Of Law Cannot Be Stopped'
and, as noted above, we can speculate that the litigation described here
played a large role in the impeachment campaign. The decisions of the
Supreme Court in 1780 and 1787, particularly the latter, are, to say the
least, difficult to explain, and must have struck many as an affront to the
most basic principles of the rule of law. We can also see the importance
of the Court of Chancery in doing justice where a common law court
could, or would, not, a point made in one of the few other studies of civil
litigation in Canadian history. 2'
More broadly, these cases also tell us something about the role of law
and litigation in society. We see here both a pronounced willingness to
use the legal system, a sense that it was available to men of relatively
modest means, and some knowledge of its procedures and possibilities.
We suspect that law and courts were not foreign to eighteenth-century
Nova Scotians, that civil litigation was a part of everyday life for a wide
spectrum of people. One has only to glance at the finding aids for the civil
records of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia for Halifax to see that a
small population could produce a large volume of everyday litigation,'2 '
and communities outside the capital appear to have acted the same way.
Whether this was a product of New England influence-many studies
have shown high rates of litigation in colonial New England-is a
question that must await further study. 22 But there certainly seems to
have been no reluctance to go to law.
Finally, we would note the communal divisiveness that could result
from civil litigation. Along the way the cases discussed here engaged
many of Cumberland county's families and, more importantly, the civil
litigation was the major, if not the only, contributor to fanning the flames
120. See Girard, "Taking Litigation Seriously" supra note 116.
121. See RG 39, Series C, vols. I et seq, passim.
122. For New England see, inter alia, B. Mann, Neighbours and Strangers: Law and
Community in Early Connecticut (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987);
W.E. Nelson, Dispute and Conflict Resolution in Plymouth County, Massachusetts, 1725-1825
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981); D.T. Konig, Law and Society in
Puritan Massachusetts, Essex County, 1629-1692 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1979). There are very few quantitative studies of civil litigation in Canadian history, and
mostof them deal only with one areaof the law: see, forexample, R.C.B. Risk," 'This Nuisance
of Litigation': The Origins of Workers Compensation in Ontario," in D. Flaherty, ed., Essays
in the History of Canadian Law: Volume Two (Toronto: University of Toronto Press and
Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 1983), and L. Chambers, Married Women and
Property Law in Victorian Ontario (Toronto: University of Toronto Press and Osgoode
Society for Canadian Legal History, 1997). A recent more general account is J.P. Couturier,
"Courts and Business Activity in Late 19th Century New Brunswick: A View from the Case
Files" (1997) 26 Acadiensis 77.
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of intra-community political and personal discord. The local rebellion
was long over, the treason proceedings following it long stayed, but
arguments and enmities dragged on in the civil courts. And the sequence
of events described here represents more than simply the fact that the
courts provided a forum for playing out old rivalries, although they
certainly did that. Litigation was not simply the medium, it became the
message, became both the device used to wreak political revenge for the
rebellion and, because the law and the courts were fora open to all,
litigation was also a shield for those under assault. We know very little
about how large political, economic and social conflicts have been
historically played out in our civil courts; this example suggests that we
ought to know a good deal more.
